GAINS AND LOSSES OF SUGAR PROGRAM POLICY OPTIONS
Since the 1930s, U. S. sugar producers have been protected by government programs designed to insulate the domestic sugar market from world forces of supply and demand. The intervention of government in the domestic sugar market has had the effect of redistributing income among interest groups in a manner different than that resulting from the interaction of free economic market forces.
In establishing a framework for industry protection, politically motivated rent-seeking activities emerge as an important part of the industry. In sugar, the initial rent seekers were the producers, importers, and refiners.
However, with domestic sugar prices maintained at a level substantially in excess of world prices, economic incentives exist whereby other interest _ groups attempt to participate in, avoid, or share the economic rents engendered by sugar policy. These other interest groups include producers and users of sugar substitutes--corn producers, corn sweetener manufacturers, noncaloric sweetener manufacturers, sweetener containing food product manufacturers (sugar users), and consumers.
The success of sugar substitute producers and users in capturing about 40 pecent of the total sweetener market by 1984 has put a new set of economic and political rent-seeking forces in motion. The economic interests in sugar policy have become realigned. In the process, questions of the need for a new approach to sugar policy are being raised. , The purpose of this article is to provide a quantitative insight into the distribution of costs and benefits associated with various sugar policy options. In the process, inferences can be drawn for the positions of each of :Ya the major sugar policy interest groups. By contrast with previous analyses of this type, explicit consideration is given to shifts in sugar demand resulting from the substitution of corn sweeteners for sugar. In the analysis, three general policy options were considered: the program prevailing in 1983 involving a sugar price support achieved primarily by the imposition of import quotas, a tariff substituted for the quota, and a target price (deficiency payment) substituted for the quotg
Analytical Framework
The supply and demand model used as a framework for the study is given in Figure 1 . The supply and demand schedule in the United States is So and DO.
Assuming the excess supply curve is completely elastic, the free trade price is P 0 and imports are QsfQdf. However, under a quota program, domestic 0 price is P 1 and imports are QsQd ' If the increase in the price of sugar due 0 to the quota does not result in a shift to other sweeteners (e.g., corn sweeteners), the net cost of the quota is cabd. The distance between Po and PI is the quota price premium.
If instead of a quota a tariff were in place, the tariff policy would have cost domestic consumers P 0 abP 1 and benefited domestic producers P 0 cdP 1 while the tariff revenue would have been febd. The net cost of the tariff policy would have been cfd + eab--a much smaller societal cost than that imposed by a quota. The equivalent quota policy would have the same effects on domestic consumers and producers except that foreign exporters are the recipients of the tariff equivalent revenue or quota rent. If a deficiency payment program were used to replace a quota policy and producer price were maintained at P1 the deficiency payment program would cost the Treasury or taxpayers PofdPi. Consumers would benefit by P0abP1 and there would be a net gain of fabd as compared to a quota policy.
The quota, which is a hidden subsidy to producers, is by far the most costly program to pursue even though the Treasury does not directly subsidize the industry. To protect domestic producers by the amount PocdPI, the net cost is cabd. On the other hand, a deficiency payment which protects producers by the same amount only results in a loss of cdf. This is because with the quota the price to the user is kept at P1 whereas with the deficiency payment the price to the users is Po (the world price).
The demand for sugar is a function not only of sugar prices but also of other variables including the price of corn. As a result of the price of sugar being kept above the free market equilibrium by the quota, in the 1960s and 1970s there was a marked shift to corn sweetener substitutes (mainly high fructose corn syrup, HFCS). Accordingly, the sugar demand curve in the United States has shifted leftward over a period of years and is ultimately represented by Dl. The loss in consumers' surplus in the sugar market is reduced from P 0 abP 1 to P 0 a'b'P • the quota rent is also reduced from febd to fe'b'd.
In order to illustrate the substitution that has occurred, the empirical sec- 
where Q t is per capita consumption of refined sugar (pounds) and P t is wholesale list price in cents per pound for refined sugar in the northeastern 
Sugar Supply
The sugar supply estimates used are taken from Gemmill. His raw sugar supply estimates are converted to refined sugar supply responses by using a factor of 1.07, which is the units of raw sugar needed to produce one unit of refined sugar. Gemmill estimated separate supply equations for the sugar cane producing areas of Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Hawaii and for aggregate U. S.
sugar beet production. By aggregating these five equations and converting to refined sugar, the estimated U. S. refined sugar supply curve for 1983 is = 1,061.062 + 341.829Pt
where Q t is total U. S. refined sugar supply (in 1,000 metric tons) and P t is refined sugar price deflated by the consumer price index (1967 = 100). The associated price elasticity is 0.645.
Because supply price estimates are sensitive to model specification, the following illustrates the effect of using an elasticity greater than 0.645, namely, 1.20. For a quota price premium of 7.49 cents per pound, the producer gain from a quota is $709.7 million for an elasticity of .645. The gain is $670.9 million for a price elasticity of 1.2. The difference of $38.8 million is less than 6 percent of the mean of the two producer welfare estimates.
Sugar Program Alternative Effects
If the government did not intervene in the sugar industry, it would only be necessary to consider the economic markets to understand the industry, world sugar supply and demand would determine sugar price which would allocate resources accordingly. However, Congress has tried to (1) maintain a domestic sugar industry, (2) assure sugar supplies to consumers, and (3) promote general export trade. To achieve these objectives, a mixture of policy instruments--including domestic and foreign marketing quotas, direct payments to producers and tariffs and excise taxes--has been used (Johnson) . Figure 1 ) is the gain from substitution to corn sweeteners. Thus, as a lower limit, the net cost of the sugar program for a 15 cents per pound premium is $1,355.9 million while the upper bound is $2,345 million. 5
Quota policies generate quota rents to exporters (e.g., fe'b'd in Figure 2), the magnitude of which is indicated in Table 2 . These quota rents may be captured by the exporting country, market intermediaries, or refiners.
Available evidence suggests that about half of the quota rent is received by countries exporting raw sugar to the United States. When the world price is 7 cents per pound on a raw basis and the U. S. raw sugar price is maintained at 22 cents per pound (16.05 cents per pound refined basis difference), quota rents total $997.4 million. In the long run with a higher average world price, the importer quota rent would total $465.5 million.
Over time, the effect of the sugar program has been to reduce the quota rents. For example, based on 1963 consumption without the substitution to HFCS, the quota rent would have been $1,986.4 million (not shown in Table 2 ).
The effect of HFCS substitution has been to reduce the size of the Quota thus reducing the value of the quota rents. Interestingly, while countries holding sugar quotas once favored a restrictive U. S. sugar policy which generated high quota rents, they are now joining with sugar user and consumer groups in support of lower sugar price support as a means of maintaining a market for sugar in the United States. The above point can also he seen by comparing the value of exports under free trade with the value of exports including the quota rents ( Table 2 ). The value of free trade exports exceeds the value of exports including quota rents. The point to emphasize here is that a free trade If a sugar deficiency payment program were used to replace a quota program and producer prices were maintained at the quota level, the consumer gain, producer effect, Treasury expenditure, and net gains from this replacement are shown in Table 4 . Sugar producers lose nothing while consumers gain from consuming more sugar at a lower sugar price. The Treasury would have to pay sugar producers $1,672.5 million at 1983 world sugar prices. However, a deficiency payment scheme would generate a net societal gain of $1,525.2 million at a 16.05 cents per pound price premium relative to a quota policy. (Figure 2) . 0
Summary and Conclusions
The net societal costs of the different programs (import quotas, tariffs, and deficiency payments) are summarized in Table 5 . Note that tariffs result in a net cost of roughly the same magnitude as a deficiency payment. Both types of policies result in a small cost relative to quotas. The cost of the current quota policy is roughly four times that of either a deficiency payment or tariffs.
The main instrument of U. S. sugar policy is an import quota. Quotas are not the least-cost way to protect domestic producers. Alternatives to quotas were discussed including the use of deficiency payments. The net cost of deficiency payments is much less than that incurred under quotas. With deficiency payments, U. S. consumers and sugar users pay the world price for sugar--unlike in the quota case. The major reason the costs with a deficiency payment are less than under a quota is that there are no quota rents; hence, the exporters of sugar to the United States receive only the world market price. Based on economic considerations, even a tariff as a policy instrument is preferred to a quota because it generates U. S. government revenue while protecting producer returns. Clearly in policy decisions, the government deficit is of major concern; this is, perhaps, the reason sugar quotas are used rather than the other policies discussed. With quotas, the government does not have to spend major amounts on the sugar program. However, it would not have expenditures under a preferential tariff program either.
In the choice of a policy instrument, no mention was made of the effect of exchange rates. Owing to the rising strength of the U. S. dollar in the 1980s, imports of sugar became cheaper relative to domestic sources. Thus, ceteris paribus, as the dollar appreciates, a tariff stated in U. S. dollars must be increased in order to maintain a given U. S. price. In the 1980s, the exchange rate movement was a factor in moving away from tariff protection to a quota system. To keep producer welfare unchanged, tariffs had to be increased as the U. S. dollar appreciated.
Policies affect relative product and input prices in different ways. A quota policy keeps the price of sugar high relative to domestic corn prices.
This is not the case with deficiency payments. The high price of domestically used sugar relative to corn was a factor in the substantial growth of corn sweeteners. This brought about a reduction in sugar imports. In terms of interest.groups, it is clear why corn producers and corn sweetener manufacturers like the quota system and why users, such as candy manufacturers who rely heavily on sugar, would prefer some form of a deficiency payment scheme as this type of a program lowers sugar prices to users. However, there are other groups to be considered. With quotas, the U. S. government has no Treasury exposure, this is not true with respect to deficiency payments. Also, with deficiency payments, exporters of sugar to the United States receive no quota rents. This poses an interesting dilemma for exporters. The U. S. quotas give exporters quota rents, but they also reduce the volume of trade--partly because of the substitution toward corn sweeteners. Therefore, quotas are a mixed blessing. -In the long run, sugar exporters may be better off to give up their quota rents in order to achieve the gains from expanded exports to the United States under a free market price. This is what a deficiency payment program would help bring about.
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1
The general form of demand for refined sugar is Q = Q(P, q, 1), where P is the price vector which will change due to the contemplated sugar policy, q is the other price vector which will remain constant when sugar policy changes and can be reasonably assumed to be proportional to some fixed vector q° so that q = cq° for some scalar c, and Z is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics. A first-order Taylor expansion of this equation would lead to the econometric specification (Hausman, p. 670) , Q = rZ + 4. 1 (aiP/qi). By Hick's composite commodity theorem, the latter equation can be rewritten as Q = rZ + [4 .1 (aitq)] P/c and Q = rZ + f3(P/c), where f3 = 4 1=1 (cl1/c17) and P/c is real price when c is regarded as a price index.
2The area above the refined sugar supply curve also includes rents to sugar processors.
3 Usually, the quota premium is discussed in terms of raw sugar. The program effects for 7-cent, 10-cent, and 15-cent premium levels were studied.
As the quantity of refined sugar is derived by dividing the quantity of raw sugar by 1.07, the equivalent premiums in refined sugar form are 7.49 cents, 10.70 cents, and 16.05 cents. Also, under equilibrium conditions, the 32 cents per pound of refined sugar can be regarded as equivalent to 22.04 cents per pound of raw sugar.
V " -22-4 It needs to be remembered that the 16.05-cent quota premium is a short-run proposition. While it was a very real situation in the mid 1980s, in all probability it would not exist if the United States were in a free trade posture. If it did exist over the long run, production in the United
States would probably fall to zero. Thus, the production estimates in this instance must be viewed in a short-run context.
5
To determine the exact gain to consumers from substitution to corn sweeteners and, in addition, isolate the gain to corn producers and corn processors from this effect, a general equilibrium welfare analysis is needed. The framework has been provided by Just Hueth, and Schmitz.
6 The HFCS price and cost data suggest that, if the sugar price support were reduced to 15 cents per pound, sugar would be in a longer run competitive relationship with HFCS.
